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I would like to make a few comments which do not touch specifi-
cally on what John Moore said, but deal with the general question
which has been raised as to what role the United States can play
when dealing with internal conflict in other states. It is very easy
when addressing that question to blur the tremendous differences
that occur in individual states at any given time in history. When
considering the issue of destablization and whether norms can be
adopted to govern the influence of other states, several factors
have to be taken into account.
First, the legitimacy of the government in power has to be con-
sidered. Legitimacy has to be viewed in terms of how the people
perceive their government at a particular moment in its history.
The Nicaraguan case is interesting in this regard. Samosa was
elected for a second term in 1974, which in and of itself was proba-
bly illegal since the Nicaraguan constitution had determined that
there should be no reelection. In 1972, Samosa circumvented the
constitution to devise a method by which a triumvarite would sit
in power for a certain period of time, with the notion clearly in
mind that he would be elected for a second term when the new
constitution was written. Indeed, it was rewritten, and he was re-
elected. The situation began to deteriorate following the events of
his second election, and more importantly, with his maladministra-
tion following the earthquake of 1972-73.
There was no question about Samosa's being the legitimate pres-
ident of Nicaragua. Equally as unquestionable, to the Nicaraguan
people at least, was that he had used the national guard and other
political devices to become reelected. Internally, a body politic ex-
isted which looked upon Samosa as a growing evil and an illegiti-
mate president. In 1978, violence began, initiated by the assassina-
tion of Pedro Joaquin Chamoro, a well known, charismatic,
political opponent of Samosa.
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The United States and other members of the Organization of
American States became concerned about the clearly deteriorating
situation in Nicaragua. The question of the credibility or the legiti-
macy of Samosa was paramount. Interestingly, the Organization of
American States initiated a mediation effort in 1978, which proba-
bly was historic in its attempt to remove a standing president
through the process of mediating differences between him and his
opposition forces. There was no question that unless Samosa left,
the situation would deteriorate into civil war. Mediation ultimately
failed because the issues of legitimacy and the legal basis upon
which Samosa was reigning could not be resolved. Those involved
in the mediation effort were convinced that the removal of Samosa,
which was certainly possible in terms of the array of forces and the
attitude of nations in the area, would have eliminated the problem.
That is to say, there was a base of moderate political leadership
available to lead a transition government. In fact, the modalities
were all clearly defined as to how to make the change from the
Samosa government to a transition government, and from there to
a new electoral procedure. The mediation failed because in the
United States, at the highest level, there was fear that the United
States would be involved in an act that was illegitimate in the
sense that we would be deposing a legitimately elected president in
Nicaragua. Even though our efforts were great, and people were
sent in to try to convince Samosa to leave, the key was that he was
a legitimate president. Failing to remove him in 1978 opened the
door to violence because the moderates of Nicaragua were much
discredited in the United States, and the Organization of American
States was discredited in terms of its ability to bring about change
under crisis conditions. At that point, the FSLN became the sole
means of removing Samosa. It was then that nations began to in-
tervene very openly on the side of the FSLN. At the beginning, the
intervention came not so much from Cuba as from Venezula, Pan-
ama, and, most importantly, Costa Rica, which offered sanctuary
and a supply base. Cuba provided support as well, but the primary
result of the failure of the mediation was the open intervention on
the part of the FSLN. This episode highlights the question of
when the international community can intervene-in this case us-
ing the Organization of American States as the vehicle-to settle
an internal dispute which has reached crisis proportion. The unfor-
tunate reality was that it failed on that occasion. The net effects
were the violent fall of the Samosa regime and the entry into
power of a revolutionary group of people who looked upon the
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moderates as their enemies, even though the moderates in that so-
ciety had helped in the destablization of the Samosa regime. In-
deed, the history of Central America since that time has been
colored in great measure by what happened in Nicaragua, because
every guerilla group in Central America, following the success of
the Sandanistas, assumed that the day of revolution had arrived in
Central America. For example, the overthrow by elements within
the power structure in El Salvador of the government of Romero
shortly after the fall of Samosa was an attempt by the elites in El
Salvador to bring about a process of reform and avoid the over-
throw and collapse of the army as had occurred in Nicaragua. So it
seems that there are times-and the Nicaraguan case points it
up-when the international community and the United States can
play a major role in bringing about a peaceful resolution of a major
crisis. How one overcomes the question of legitimacy is important
to the attitude that will affect American decision-makers faced
with that type of crisis situation.
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